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INTRODUCTION 
Amazon’s meteoric growth and expansion—accelerated by the global 
COVID-19 pandemic1— signals the revolutionary transformation away from 
brick-and-mortar physical stores to the virtual marketplace. Known as a 
“half-platform, half-store,”2 Amazon’s e-commerce business, which offers a 
platform for third-party vendors,3 defies conventional categorization for 
products liability purposes.  
From the consumer perspective, “[m]any of the millions of people who 
shop on Amazon.com see it as if it were an American big-box store, a retailer 
with goods deemed safe enough for customers.”4 Amazon offers 
innumerable benefits to these consumers, including an abundant supply of 
goods available in a one-stop shopping venue, competitive prices, and 
prompt delivery—all the more essential during a pandemic that requires 
social distancing.  
But there is a dark side to the proliferation of products in Amazon’s 
virtual marketplace: As uncovered in a harrowing August 2019 Wall Street 
Journal article, among the items for sale on Amazon are thousands of 
 
 1 See Shantal Riley, Appeals Court: Amazon Was “Pivotal” in the Sale of Exploding Battery, 
FRONTLINE (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/appeals-court-rules-amazon-
can-be-liable/ [https://perma.cc/7KUN-NUM2] (“Amazon’s sales have soared this year as more people 
shop online amidst the coronavirus pandemic. The company’s second-quarter sales rose by 40% and net 
profits have doubled to $5.2 billion over the same period last year.”); Hamza Shaban, Amazon to Hire 
100,000 Workers as e-Commerce Swells Amid the Pandemic, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2020, 2:28 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/09/14/amazon-hire-100000-workers-e-commerce-
swells-amid-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/QMY3-3JDD] (“Amazon said Monday it will hire another 
100,000 workers to meet surging demand in the covid-19 era, bolstering an already dramatic expansion 
of its workforce this year and underscoring the massive shifts in online spending the pandemic has helped 
fuel.”). 
 2 Colin Lecher, How Amazon Escapes Liability for the Riskiest Products on Its Site, VERGE (Jan. 28, 
2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/28/21080720/amazon-product-liability-lawsuits-
marketplace-damage-third-party [https://perma.cc/65FM-47QL]. 
 3 Brian Huseman, Amazon Stands Ready to Support AB 3262 If All Stores Are Held to the Same 
Standards, DAYONE: AMAZON BLOG (Aug. 21, 2020), https://blog.aboutamazon.com/policy/amazon-
stands-ready-to-support-ab-3262-if-all-stores-are-held-to-the-same-standards [https://perma.cc/2BNP-
X323] (“Since 1999, Amazon has welcomed third-party sellers onto Amazon.com and enabled them to 
offer their products right alongside our own, giving entrepreneurs an unprecedented opportunity to reach 
hundreds of millions of customers worldwide. These sellers, which are mainly small and medium-sized 
businesses, now sell the vast majority of new products—and nearly 60% of all products—purchased on 
Amazon.com.”). 
 4 Alexandra Berzon, Shane Shifflett & Justin Scheck, Amazon Has Ceded Control of Its Site. The 
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products “declared unsafe by federal agencies . . . deceptively labeled or . . . 
banned by federal regulators.”5 
Amazon insists that, as an online platform serving as a conduit between 
third-party vendors and consumers, akin to a virtual flea market, it is not a 
“seller” of goods and therefore should not be held responsible for defective 
or unsafe products available on its site.6 Courts initially sided with Amazon, 
primarily focusing on “bright line” doctrinal distinctions, such as the fact that 
Amazon did not transfer legal title of the third-party goods supplied (finding 
instead that title was transferred from the third-party vendor to the buyer, 
with Amazon merely acting as the intermediary).7 Indeed, by 2018, as 
recognized by a New York federal district court, there was “an emerging 
consensus against construing Amazon as a ‘seller’ or ‘distributor.’”8 
But we may have reached an inflection point. In July 2019, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., which became the first decision to hold that a customer could proceed 
with a strict products liability claim against Amazon for harms due to an 
 
 5 Id. (“The Journal identified at least 157 items for sale that Amazon said it banned, including sleeping 
mats the Food and Drug Administration warns can suffocate infants. . . . Within two weeks of Amazon’s 
removing or altering the first problematic listings the Journal identified, at least 130 items with the same 
policy violations reappeared, some sold by the same vendors previously identified by the Journal under 
different listings.”). 
 6 See, e.g., Gartner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1042 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (“[Amazon] 
contends that its marketplace is much like an auctioneer as they play only an incidental role in a product’s 
placement in the stream of commerce.”), appeal docketed sub nom. McMillan v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 
20-20108 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 2020); see also Berzon, Shifflett & Scheck, supra note 4 (“In practice, 
Amazon has increasingly evolved like a flea market. It exercises limited oversight over items listed by 
millions of third-party sellers, many of them anonymous, many in China, some offering scant 
information.”). 
 7 See, e.g., Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[R]egardless 
of what attributes are necessary to place an entity within the chain of distribution, the failure to take title 
to a product places that entity on the outside.”); Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 141 
(4th Cir. 2019) (“[I]nsofar as liability in Maryland for defective products falls on ‘sellers’ and 
manufacturers (who are also sellers), it is imposed on owners of personal property who transfer title to 
purchasers of that property for a price.”). 
 8 Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 400. “[I]t appears that every court to consider the question of 
Amazon’s liability has concluded that Amazon is not strictly liable for defective products sold on its 
marketplace.” Id. at 399 (citing Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738 (FLW)(LHG), 
2018 WL 3546197, at *5–12 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018); Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-03013, 
2018 WL 2431628, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 930 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 
2019); Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 16-02679-RWT, 2018 WL 3046243, at *1–3 (D. Md. Jan. 
22, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 925 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 2019); Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. 
Supp. 3d 496, 499–501 (M.D. Pa. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 930 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2019), 
certifying questions to Pa. S. Ct., 818 F. App’x 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed per 
stipulation; Stiner v. Amazon.com Inc, No. 15CV185837, 2017 WL 9751163, at *5–7 (Ohio Com. Pl. 
2017), aff’d, 120 N.E.3d 885 (Ohio App. 2019), aff’d, No. 2019-0488, 2020 WL 5822477 (Ohio Oct. 1, 
2020)). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
342 
allegedly unsafe product.9 Taking the case en banc, the Third Circuit certified 
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the question whether “an e-commerce 
business, like Amazon, [is] strictly liable for a defective product that was 
purchased on its platform from a third-party vendor, which product was 
neither possessed nor owned by the e-commerce business.”10  
In Oberdorf’s wake, a federal district court in Texas and a California 
state appellate court likewise held that Amazon is a “seller” that may be 
strictly liable for defective products sold on Amazon.11 Amazon has appealed 
both of these decisions.12 And, after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed 
to answer the certified question in Oberdorf, Amazon settled the case, 
thereby thwarting that court’s resolution of this “issue of first impression and 
substantial public importance.”13 Still, with pending appeals in other state 
and federal courts,14 the time is ripe for evaluating the case for holding 
Amazon liable for these dangerous and defective products. 
 
 9 930 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2019), vacated, 936 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019), certifying question to Pa. S. Ct., 
818 F. App’x 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed per stipulation. 
 10 Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 818 F. App’x 138, 143 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed 
per stipulation. 
 11 Gartner, 433 F. Supp. 3d at 1042–43 (finding that “Amazon is integrally involved in and exerts 
control over the sales of third-party products such that it qualifies as a seller” and “Amazon was engaged 
in the business of placing the product in the stream of commerce and, therefore, qualifies as a seller”); 
Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, 53 Cal. App. 5th 431, 448, 453 (2020), petition for review filed, No. 
S264607 (Cal. Sept. 22, 2020) (finding that Amazon plays an “integral part of the overall producing and 
marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products,” is “involved 
in the vertical distribution of consumer goods” and “responsible for passing the product down the line to 
the consumer,” and is “one of the entities ‘responsible for placing a defective product into the stream of 
commerce’”) (internal citations omitted). But see Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2019-0488, 2020 WL 
5822477, at *4 (Ohio Oct. 1, 2020) (explaining that “[b]ased on the understanding that placing a product 
in the stream of commerce requires some act of control over the product, we conclude that Amazon should 
not be held liable as a supplier under the Ohio Products Liability Act.”). 
 12 In its Bolger petition for review to the California Supreme Court, Amazon argues that the lower 
court took an “unprecedented leap” in holding Amazon liable as a seller and “usurped the Legislature’s 
role” by “creat[ing] entirely new rules of strict liability.” Petition for Review at 6, Bolger, No. S264607 
(Cal. Sept. 22, 2020). Likewise, in its McMillan brief on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Amazon contends 
that “[b]asing liability on control over services would produce wildly unpredictable and far-reaching 
results, which explains why no court has adopted such a rule.” Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, McMillan 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 20-20108 (5th Cir. July 24, 2020). 
 13 818 F. App’x at 143. 
 14 In addition to the Bolger and McMillan appeals pending in the California Supreme Court and Fifth 
Circuit, respectively, an appeal of an underlying grant of summary judgment to Amazon is pending in the 
Ninth Circuit in Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 19-15695 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2019). In Carpenter, a 
California federal district court granted summary judgment to Amazon given plaintiffs’ failure to show 
that Amazon was “integral” to the business, “such that its conduct was a necessary factor in bringing the 
defective product to market.” Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-cv-03221-JST, 2019 WL 1259158, 
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-15695 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2019). Oral argument took 
place on October 20, 2020. Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 19-15695 (9th Cir. June 25, 2020), ECF 
No. 42. Additionally, Papataros v. Amazon.com, Inc., was stayed pending the outcome in Oberdorf. No. 
2:17-cv-9836 (KM)(MAH), 2019 WL 4740669 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 2019). 
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David Wilk, the attorney representing Heather Oberdorf—who was 
blinded in one eye by a retractable dog leash attached to a dog collar she 
purchased on Amazon—explained that he believes “at its core the decision 
is about how e-commerce functions in our everyday lives, and that the courts 
must catch up to consumers’ perception that Amazon is responsible for the 
goods it sells.”15 Wilk framed the key issue as: “Really what it comes down 
to is is the court going to recognize how people buy things in the modern 
world?”16 
Wilk’s comments channel tort law guru Professor Marshall Shapo’s 
mantra of “tort as a cultural mirror.”17 Long before the Internet added new 
complications, Professor Shapo argued that “the seemingly technical issue 
of whether to impose retailer strict liability for defective products presents a 
cameo of culturally generated attitudes held both by people generally and by 
judges.”18 Although Professor Shapo has not yet weighed in on whether 
Amazon should be held strictly liable for defective products offered by third-
party sellers on its website, I argue in Part I that the evolution of products 
liability law to hold Amazon liable is consistent with his cultural lens in light 
of how the reasonable expectations of consumers have changed. The 
platform economy and the “emerging injury problems”19 it has spawned 
represent a seismic shift calling out for a reconception of accountability in 
products liability law. The recent court decisions holding Amazon liable as 
a seller follow consumer sentiment and show this cultural shift in action. 
Furthermore, as I elaborate in Part II, holding Amazon liable is 
supported by the economic perspective embodied in the “cheapest cost 
avoider” analysis—Amazon is best situated to take actions to minimize risks 
and prevent accidents from happening. To determine whether the doctrine of 
strict products liability should be applied in a situation without legal 
 
 15 Pamela Boykoff & Clare Sebastian, Who’s Responsible for What You Buy on Amazon? A Court Is 
About to Decide, CNN (Feb. 19, 2020, 7:35 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/19/tech/amazon-third-
party-lawsuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/45UY-WPS6]. 
 16 Id. In a similar vein, attorney Jeremy Robinson, who represents Angela Bolger—who was 
hospitalized with third-degree burns after a replacement laptop battery purchased on Amazon exploded 
in her lap—remarked: “This is the way things are going to get sold in the future . . . . I think the sooner 
the courts and legislatures manage to get their heads around this, the better.” Riley, supra note 1. 
 17 Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship Can Teach Us About the 
American Experience, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (1995) [hereinafter Shapo, In the Looking Glass]; 
see also Marshall S. Shapo, Millennial Torts, 33 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1045 (1999) [hereinafter Shapo, 
Millennial Torts] (arguing that “tort undoubtedly will continue to serve as a social symbol, a cultural 
mirror that reflects the moral views of society”); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE 269 
(2003) [hereinafter SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE] (invoking “tort as a reflector of culture”). 
 18 SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 17, at 194. 
 19 See Shapo, Millennial Torts, supra note 17, at 1043 (“Tort also will continue to play the role of 
the initial decider between first-best and second-best solutions for emerging injury problems.”). 
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precedent, courts should eschew artificial distinctions that frustrate the 
intended purposes underlying strict liability, including enhancing product 
safety and minimizing the losses that arise out of the general use of the 
product.20  
This convergence of the cultural and economic perspectives has echoes 
in history: Just as the changing economic framework of the early twentieth 
century led to a legal change away from the requirement of privity in 
products liability to strict liability,21 so too should the onset of e-commerce 
sites like Amazon lead to the expansion of strict products liability to cases 
involving online commerce businesses. Indeed, the culturally specific norm 
of efficiency-as-responsibility is now a signature feature of twenty-first 
century tort law. 
I. TORT LAW AS A “CULTURAL MIRROR” 
One of Professor Shapo’s signature contributions to the legal field is his 
articulation of “tort as a cultural mirror.”22 In his 2003 book, Tort Law and 
Culture, Professor Shapo presents the thesis that tort law is an accurate 
“representation of local, even national, culture,”23 defining culture as “the 
vast collection of social customs, rules, standards, and viewpoints that 
generate attitudes that communities and individuals bring to bear on specific 
disputes.”24 He then argues that “the way in which a nation responds to the 
social and individual problems created by injuries provides significant 
indicators about the texture of its civilization.”25 In the United States, these 
important issues tend to make their way into our courtrooms.26  
 
 20 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORTS 687–88 (12th ed. 2020) (discussing rationales for strict products liability). 
 21 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) 
(“As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets and transportation 
facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer of a product has been altered.”); 
William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 
1140 (1960) (detailing “the whole sweep and progress of the law of the last half century” and highlighting 
“[t]he public interest in the safety of products,” in particular “standardized products, such as razor blades 
and automobile tires, where there is uniformity of production methods and quality, and a high degree of 
safety already has been achieved, so that purchasers feel that they receive, and are entitled to receive, an 
assurance of such safety”); see also SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 17, at 283 (“[I]t is 
reasonable to conclude that the idea that there should be liability without fault for injuries caused by 
dangerously defective products was responsive to an underlying set of economic and social realities, 
reflecting the culture that derived its identity from those realities.”). 
 22 Shapo, In the Looking Glass, supra note 17, at 1570. 
 23 Shapo, TORT LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 17, at 5. 
 24 Id. at 7. 
 25 Id. at 11. 
 26 Id. at 286–87 (“A mantra in academic literature today is Tocqueville’s observation more than 160 
years ago . . . that important issues in America tend to wind up in court.”). 
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Thus, tort, which “is basically judge-made law,” acts both as a 
reflection of judges’ perception and as a distillation of American culture.27 
Indeed, as Professor Shapo elaborates, “tort cases mirror broad competitions 
among cultural norms and force judges to make choices—if often implicit 
choices—among those norms.”28 And as technology changes and advances, 
these choices and the legal norms they create will also evolve.29 Courts are 
“cultural agents—realigning the law with developments in the economy and 
with the evolving attitudes of ordinary people who are coming, sometimes 
only semi-consciously, to comprehend changes in the consumer 
environment.”30 
Through this analysis, Professor Shapo has proclaimed that tort law 
“presents one evocative set of images of a journey of an increasingly 
fragmented society that is constantly in the process of discovering itself—
one might even say of discovering its soul.”31 Central to Professor Shapo’s 
conception is that courts do not take on the role of telling society what the 
cultural norms should be, but rather they consider the predominant thoughts 
and articulations in society and reflect them in legal opinions.32 
Professor Shapo’s “cultural mirror” conception has particular relevance 
for products liability. For, as Professor Shapo explains,  
[p]roducts liability law deals with Americans’ love affairs, with their 
possessions, and with the special vexations that occur when love encounters 
frustration and disappointment. It is therefore natural that this branch of the law 
should be an especially faithful mirror of the tensions that arise from our search 
for the good through goods.33  
More specifically, Professor Shapo notes that products liability raises 
interesting issues “concerning what we mean by freedom to choose and what 
we believe are legally satisfying levels of information concerning the 
decision to purchase or encounter products.”34 And foremost among 
“examples of what tort law teaches us about ourselves” include “rank[ing] 
products and activities by perceived social value, sometimes imposing 
 
 27 Id. at 269. 
 28 Shapo, In the Looking Glass, supra note 17, at 1570. 
 29 SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 17, at 11 (“That response will change with 
technology and with changes in the social awareness that defines the concept of legal right.”). 
 30 Id. at 284. 
 31 Id. at 286. 
 32 Id. at 287 (“[M]ost usually the court does not tell society what it ought to be thinking, but rather 
represents what society has been thinking, if not articulating.”). 
 33 Shapo, In the Looking Glass, supra note 17, at 1577. 
 34 Id. 
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liability and sometimes immunizing actors on the basis of those perceived 
values.”35 
Seen through Professor Shapo’s “tort-law-as-culture” lens, the Amazon 
controversy implicates fundamental shifts in the consumer marketplace and 
power dynamics. Professor Shapo is particularly attuned to the underlying 
power dynamics of societal relationships and the way in which “at some level 
of consciousness, judges attempt to decipher the way that judgments about 
the appropriate use of power pervade our social consciousness.”36 The recent 
shift in judicial opinion towards holding Amazon liable reflects this type of 
shift in cultural norms. 
A. Fundamental Shifts in the Consumer Marketplace and Power 
Dynamics 
The twenty-first century has witnessed a revolution in how consumers 
purchase goods. The “brick-and-mortar” physical store model has been 
replaced by pervasive Internet e-commerce sites. Whereas consumers once 
frequented strip malls, they now order over the Internet on ubiquitous online 
stores. Online retail sales reached $445 billion in 2017 and are projected to 
surpass $1 trillion by 2027.37 Amazon is by far the most dominant player in 
the online e-commerce domestic and global retail markets.38 It has reaped 
multibillion-dollar profits from sales via its online marketplace.39 
 
 35 Id. at 1585. 
 36 Id. at 1570; see also id. at 1591 (“The clash of ideas in tort theory should not obscure, but rather 
should sharpen, our recognition that tort law is a vehicle for resolving competitions among ideas. In 
fulfilling that mission, it delves into the fiber of our beings: how we react to confrontations between giant 
corporations and knights errant . . . .”). 
 37 See Nandita Bose, U.S. Online Retail Sales Likely to Surpass $1 Trillion by 2027: FTI, REUTERS 
(Oct. 17, 2017, 6:49 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-retail-internet/u-s-online-retail-sales-
likely-to-surpass-1-trillion-by-2027-fti-idUSKBN1CM1LW#:~:text=CHICAGO%20(Reuters)%20%2D
%20U.S.%20online,brick%2Dand%2Dmortar%20stores [https://perma.cc/68WF-NLZ4]. 
 38 In the United States, as of 2017, approximately half of all online shopping dollars were spent on 
Amazon. Eugene Kim, More than Half of Online Sales Growth in the US Came from Amazon Last Year, 
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 2, 2017, 12:33 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-drives-more-than-
half-us-ecommerce-growth-2016-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/YT44-XQTV]; see also Lauren Thomas & 
Courtney Reagan, Watch Out, Retailers. This Is Just How Big Amazon Is Becoming, CNBC (July 13, 
2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/12/amazon-to-take-almost-50-percent-of-us-e-
commerce-market-by-years-end.html [https://perma.cc/Z7EX-KW35]. And while Amazon has stumbled 
in 2020, with its share of U.S. e-commerce falling to 38.5% in June, “Amazon is still the big gorilla 
online, and sales have surged amid the pandemic.” Jay Greene & Abha Bhattarai, Amazon’s Virus 
Stumbles Have Been a Boon for Walmart and Target, WASH. POST (July 30, 2020, 6:02 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/07/30/amazon-struggles-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/8W5Q-F48K]. 
 39 See David Streitfeld, Amazon Powers Ahead with Robust Profit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/technology/amazon-earningts.html?searchResultPosition=7 
[https://perma.cc/5PSE-CH95]. 
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Amazon sells its own products as well as a rapidly increasing share of 
products from third-party vendors as part of its ever-expanding 
“marketplace” transactions.40 To make a purchase, consumers typically visit 
Amazon.com, from which point they may search for and purchase goods via 
the marketplace, while navigating entirely within the Amazon.com Internet 
domain. Yet, the products they view may not all be Amazon products. 
Amazon lists all available products and presents them to customers who 
search for items on their website, eliding the distinction between the third-
party sellers and the rest of Amazon’s platform.41 Moreover, by providing its 
customers with an “A-to-z Guarantee” for all purchases made on its website, 
Amazon holds itself out to consumers as the single entity with which they 
are transacting.42 The guarantee originally stated: 
We want you to buy with confidence anytime you make a purchase on the 
Amazon.com website or use Amazon Pay; that’s why we guarantee purchases 
from third-party sellers when payment is made via the Amazon.com 
website . . . . The condition of the item you buy and its timely delivery are 
guaranteed under the Amazon A-to-z Guarantee.43 
With its “Fulfillment by Amazon” (FBA) service, Amazon agrees with 
merchants to handle all of the packaging and shipping of their products.44 As 
 
 40 See J. Clement, Third-Party Seller Share of Amazon Platform 2007–2020, STATISTA (Aug. 10, 
2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/259782/third-party-seller-share-of-amazon-platform/ 
[https://perma.cc/2V66-HGFH] (“In 2019, Amazon generated 53.76 billion U.S. dollars in third-party 
seller service revenues, up from 42.75 billion U.S. dollars in the previous year.”); Jeff Bezos, 2018 Letter 
to Shareholders, AMAZON BLOG (Apr. 11, 2019), https://blog.aboutamazon.com/company-news/2018-
letter-to-shareholders?utm_source=social&utm_medium=tw&utm_term=amznews&utm_content=2018
letter&tag=bisafetynet2-20 [https://perma.cc/WN4Z-MV4E] (“[T]he share of physical gross 
merchandise sales sold on Amazon by independent third-party sellers—mostly small- and medium-sized 
businesses—as opposed to Amazon retail’s own first party sales . . . [have] grown from 3% of the total 
to 58%.”); see also Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, 53 Cal. App. 5th 431, 445 (2020) (“[T]he marketplace 
has more than a million third-party sellers selling their own products.”). 
 41 See Edward J. Janger & Aaron D. Twerski, The Heavy Hand of Amazon: A Seller Not a Neutral 
Platform, 14 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 259, 267 (2020) (“For a buyer, the identity of the nominal 
seller is often unclear. Indeed, through its manipulation of the so-called ‘Buy Box,’ Amazon does 
everything it can to maximize that confusion.”). 
 42 See About A-to-z Guarantee, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html
?nodeId=201889410 [https://perma.cc/7YEQ-9NPY]. 
 43 Bolger, 53 Cal. App. 5th at 442. It now reads as follows: 
The Amazon A-to-z Guarantee protects you when you purchase items sold and fulfilled by a third-
party seller. Our guarantee covers both the timely delivery and the condition of your items. If 
either are unsatisfactory, you can report the problem to us and our team will determine if you are 
eligible for a refund. 
About A-to-z Guarantee, supra note 42. 
 44 See Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2019), certifying questions to Pa. 
S. Ct., 818 F. App’x 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed per stipulation (“Amazon also offers 
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Professors Edward Janger and Aaron Twerski detail: “FBA products are 
labeled by Amazon and usually shipped in Amazon boxes. For products that 
are FBA, Amazon handles all returns and customer service requests. FBA 
stands out for the amount of control Amazon takes over the product.”45 
Amazon connects hundreds of millions of customers with a seemingly 
endless array of products, offering unbeatable prices, selection, and 
convenience. In doing so, the website remains at the center of the customer’s 
experience, regardless of whether she is purchasing a product supplied by a 
third-party or from Amazon itself. From the consumer’s perspective, 
Amazon fulfills many traditional functions of a distributor and retailer. 
Consider: Who does the consumer think is selling her the good? What does 
the consumer think of Amazon’s role in that process? Consumers deal with 
Amazon directly, not third-party vendors.46 And even when consumers may 
understand that third-party sellers are the source of a product, they likely 
expect that Amazon is selecting and vetting the goods sold on its 
marketplace. Consumers are therefore reasonably relying on Amazon, 
sometimes to their detriment, as it turns out. 
B. Holding Amazon Liable Reflects Shifting Cultural Norms 
For Professor Shapo, “the seemingly technical issue of whether to 
impose retailer strict liability for defective products,” at its core, “presents a 
cameo of culturally generated attitudes held both by people generally and by 
judges.”47 He has written evocatively that the “clash between the committed 
opponents on [products liability issues]—and the inner tensions of those who 
go back and forth on it within their own minds—would replicate struggles in 
the minds of the judges who must rule on these cases.”48 
 
a ‘Fulfillment by Amazon’ service, in which it takes physical possession of third-party vendors’ products 
and ships those products to consumers.”). 
 45 Janger & Twerski, supra note 41, at 266. Professors Janger and Twerski provide a detailed account 
of Amazon’s business model. See id. at 262 (“Whether Amazon should be considered ‘in control’—and 
therefore a ‘seller’—turns on an examination of both sides of Amazon’s role in the transaction: the 
relationship with and experience of the buyer; and the heretofore unexamined and underappreciated 
relationship with and experience of the nominal third-party supplier.”). 
 46 See Bolger, 53 Cal. App. 5th at 441 (“The supplier has no direct relationship with the buyer, and 
indeed in most cases does not even have an indirect relationship with the buyer. That is, in most cases 
there are no communications between FBA supplier and buyer; the FBA supplier simply discovers in a 
report or some other form of notification that a product has been sold to the buyer.”). 
 47 SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 17, at 194. Professor Shapo notes further: “The 
existence of the immunizing statutes alongside the judicial decisions imposing liability manifests the 
internal conflicts that ordinary citizens would have over the fairness of this particular sort of liability.” 
Id. 
 48 Id. 
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The judicial decisions on Amazon’s liability fit Professor Shapo’s 
paradigm. The most recent decisions seem to reflect a shift in cultural 
norms—for instance, as the California state appellate court in Bolger v. 
Amazon.com, LLC explained it, “[w]hatever term we use to describe 
Amazon’s role, be it ‘retailer,’ ‘distributor,’ or merely ‘facilitator,’ it was 
pivotal in bringing the product here to the consumer.”49  
But the first rash of judicial decisions absolved Amazon, finding that 
the company did not fit the “technical” or “ordinary” definition of a seller as 
the owner of personal property who transfers title to purchasers of that 
property for a price.50 Even where the Fourth Circuit in Erie Insurance Co. 
v. Amazon.com recognized that “Amazon’s services were extensive in 
facilitating the sale,” it concluded that “they are no more meaningful to the 
analysis than are the services provided by UPS Ground, which delivered [the 
product to the customer].”51 In similar fashion, an Illinois federal district 
court reasoned that Amazon’s level of participation did not rise to that of a 
seller, explaining that, “[t]hough Amazon did earn a commission from the 
[product] sale, its ‘major role’ was providing a venue and marketplace for 
 
 49 53 Cal. App. 5th at 438. 
 50 Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 2019) (“We thus conclude that 
insofar as liability in Maryland for defective products falls on ‘sellers’ and manufacturers (who are also 
sellers), it is imposed on owners of personal property who transfer title to purchasers of that property for 
a price.”); Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[R]egardless of 
what attributes are necessary to place an entity within the chain of distribution, the failure to take title to 
a product places that entity on the outside.”). In Erie, a customer purchased a headlamp on Amazon’s 
website and gifted it to friends. The headlight, sold by the company Dream Light but “Fulfilled by 
Amazon,” malfunctioned and an ensuing fire caused more than $300,000 in damages. The plaintiff, which 
insured the damaged house, sued Amazon for reimbursement under theories of negligence, breach of 
warranty, and strict liability. 925 F.3d at 137. The district court granted summary judgment to Amazon 
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 144. 
 Judges likewise absolved Amazon by granting its summary judgment motions in a series of cases 
involving defective hoverboards purchased on Amazon.com that caught fire, causing extensive physical 
injuries and property damage. See, e.g., Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415, 425 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(holding that Amazon did not qualify as a “seller” given that it “did not choose to offer the hoverboard 
for sale, did not set the price of the hoverboard, and did not make any representations about the safety or 
specifications of the hoverboard on its marketplace”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
407 F. Supp. 3d 848, 854 (D. Ariz. 2019) (noting that Amazon did “not have a meaningful ability to 
inspect [the hoverboards] for defects, never [took] title to them unless asked to, [and] derive[d] only a 
slight economic benefit from transactions involving [the products]”); Garber v. Amazon.com, Inc., 380 F. 
Supp. 3d 766, 778 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“Though Amazon did earn a commission from the hoverboard sale, 
its ‘major role’ was providing a venue and marketplace for third-party sellers . . . to connect with 
buyers.”); Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-cv-03221-JST, 2019 WL 1259158, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 19, 2019) (granting summary judgment for Amazon given plaintiffs’ failure to provide “specific 
evidence that Amazon’s conduct was a ‘necessary factor’ in bringing hoverboards to the initial consumer 
market”). Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., Doc. No. 19-15695 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2019) is currently pending 
in the Ninth Circuit.  
 51 925 F.3d at 142. 
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third-party sellers . . . to connect with buyers like the [plaintiffs].”52 By 2018, 
a New York federal district court noted “an emerging consensus against 
construing Amazon as a ‘seller’ or ‘distributor.’”53 The court instead 
characterized Amazon as providing three services: “(1) maintaining an 
online marketplace, (2) warehousing and shipping goods, and (3) processing 
payments.”54 
Even as judges ultimately sided with Amazon, there is evidence that 
they were conflicted in that decision. For instance, although Judge Diana 
Motz joined the majority’s summary judgment in favor of Amazon in Erie 
Insurance Co., she expressed concern that  
Amazon’s business model shields it from traditional products liability whenever 
state law strictly requires the exchange of title for seller liability to attach, in 
many cases forcing consumers to bear the cost of injuries caused by defective 
products (particularly where the formal “seller” of a product fails even to 
provide a domestic address for service of process).55 
Eventually, judges gained greater appreciation of the changing 
relationship between Amazon and third-party sellers and the implications for 
consumers of these “new transactions in widespread use . . . in today’s 
 
 52 Garber, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 778. 
 53 Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 400. In Eberhart, the plaintiff customer purchased a coffeemaker on 
Amazon.com, sold by the third party CoffeeGet and “Fulfilled by Amazon,” which shattered, causing 
permanent nerve damage to his thumb. Id. at 395–96. The district court granted Amazon’s summary 
judgment motion, finding that Amazon is not a seller under New York state products liability law. Id. at 
395; see also Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 158, 163, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) 
(quoting Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 399) (granting Amazon summary judgment on the ground that 
Amazon was “better characterized as a provider of services” than a seller). 
 54 Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 399. 
 55 925 F.3d at 144 (Motz, J., concurring). Judge Motz reluctantly concurred in the majority judgment, 
reasoning that, “[g]iven the policy-intensive nature of this inquiry, the lack of on-point Maryland 
precedent, and Amazon’s novel business model, I cannot confidently predict that Maryland courts would 
treat Amazon as a seller under state law.” Id. at 145. At the same time, Judge Motz recognized that 
“Amazon’s strategy of removing nearly every products liability case to federal court has complicated this 
endeavor and arguably stunted the development of state law,” and suggested that “legislative reforms, 
nonremovable lawsuits, and (in appropriate cases) certification remain available to consumers and state 
leaders who seek to confront these uniquely modern challenges.” Id. 
 Indeed, states are considering such legislation. For instance, “California is currently weighing 
legislation that would make large online sellers like Amazon responsible for sales of defective products 
in the same way it does brick-and-mortar stores.” Riley, supra note 1. Moreover, Amazon has signaled 
its support for such legislation, so long as it applies to all online marketplaces. Huseman, supra note 3, 
(“We share the California legislature’s goal of keeping consumers safe. To further that goal, this 
legislation aimed at protecting consumers should apply equally to all stores, including all online 
marketplaces.”). 
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business world.”56 Moreover, judges came to realize the depth of Amazon’s 
involvement in these transactions. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc. is a case in point. A customer purchased a bathtub faucet 
on Amazon, sold by Chinese company XMJ.57 The order was “Fulfilled by 
Amazon” and was shipped in the same box as another product sold by 
Amazon.58 The faucet malfunctioned and flooded the customer’s home. The 
home was insured by the plaintiff, who sued Amazon for strict products 
liability under Wisconsin law.59 The district court denied Amazon’s 
summary judgment motion because “Amazon was so deeply involved in the 
transaction.”60  
Indeed, as the California state appellate court in Bolger explained, 
Amazon’s business model compels the consumer to interact directly with 
Amazon, not the seller, when placing an order and paying for a product.61 In 
Professor Shapo’s conception, in these emergent cases, judges have 
seemingly come full circle, with the realization that, from the perspective of 
the consumer, “Amazon took on all the roles of a traditional—and very 
powerful—reseller/distributor.”62 
 
 56 Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, 53 Cal. App. 5th 431, 438 (2020) (internal quotation omitted). 
Moreover, as judges “[a]pply[] the 1980s retail-sales paradigm to modern e-commerce,” they have begun 
to recognize that state products liability acts drafted in the 1980s “do[] not address many of the 
contemporary standards in technology, communications, and commerce—standards that have changed 
radically since 1988.” Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2019-0488, 2020 WL 5822477, at *7 (Ohio Oct. 
1, 2020) (Donnelly, J., concurring in the judgment only). As Justice Donnelly aptly noted: “The divide 
between the pre-Internet age and the current age is so profound that laws like this [Ohio Products 
Liability] Act might as well have been written in the stone age.” Id. And “[e]ven if Amazon cannot be 
considered a supplier in the traditional pre-Internet sense, . . . its all-encompassing participation in the 
sales transactions of its third-party merchants places Amazon squarely on the supply chain, between the 
seller and the consumer.” Id. at *16. 
 57 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 964, 967 (W.D. Wis. 2019). 
 58 Id. at 967–68. 
 59 Id. at 968. Under the 2011 Wisconsin statute, “plaintiff can recover from a seller or distributor of 
a defective product, only if the seller or distributor undertakes the manufacturer’s duties, or if the 
manufacturer is unavailable or judgment proof.” Id. at 969. 
 60 Id. at 966. 
 61 53 Cal. App. 5th at 452 (“[Amazon’s] business model compels the consumer to interact directly 
with Amazon, not the seller, to place the order for the product and pay the purchase price.”); see also 
Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2019), certifying questions to Pa. S. Ct., 818 F. 
App’x 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed per stipulation (“Amazon specifically curtails the 
channels that third-party vendors may use to communicate with customers . . . .”); Janger & Twerski, 
supra note 41, at 263 (“Amazon curtails the right of third-party vendors to communicate with Amazon 
site users. They may not do so without Amazon’s permission.”); id. at 267 (“[F]or a broad swath of 
products purchased through the platform, Amazon itself controls access to the site, the manner in which 
the items are displayed, and receives compensation at every stage. In fact, except for the formality of title, 
the level of integration in Amazon’s supply chain is comparable to that of a standard brick-and-mortar 
seller.”). 
 62 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 964, 972 (W.D. Wis. 2019). 
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This transformative shift is reminiscent of a previous historical juncture 
when a strict form of liability for products was developed to account for new 
market realities and cover the widespread new transactions used in the 
business world. Nearly a century ago, Justice Roger Traynor famously 
observed that “[a]s handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with 
its great markets and transportation facilities, the close relationship between 
the producer and consumer of a product has been altered.”63 Significantly, 
“[t]he consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for 
himself the soundness of a product . . . and his erstwhile vigilance has been 
lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by 
advertising and marketing devices . . . .”64 Moreover, strict liability extended 
from manufacturers to retailers, and others similarly involved in the vertical 
distribution of consumer goods, on the ground that “[r]etailers like 
manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the 
public” and “are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing 
enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective 
products.”65 
Professor Shapo captured this “most stunning doctrinal event of the 
sixties”66 with his cultural lens, arguing that during this era “an undercurrent 
of concern with asserted imbalances of power in favor of sellers drove the 
courts to consumer-oriented decisions.”67 In his view, “[e]ven more strongly 
than it operates in the front lines of response to technology, tort law plays 
the metaphorical role of point man in the response to power. It occupies this 
role with respect to power wielded by private parties, by governments, and 
by officials.”68  
Projecting Professor Shapo’s view forward to the modern controversy 
over Amazon, it would seem that, then and now, the changing marketplace 
and power imbalances warrant the imposition of strict products liability to 
protect individuals from harms caused by defective and unsafe products. As 
summed up by a California state appellate court in Bolger, “Amazon . . . 
act[s] as a powerful intermediary between the third-party seller and the 
consumer [and] is the only member of the enterprise reasonably available to 
 
 63 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1964). 
 66 Shapo, Millennial Torts, supra note 17, at 1025. 
 67 Id. at 1026. 
 68 Id. at 1034. 
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an injured consumer in some cases . . . .”69 This context seems tailor-made 
for Professor Shapo’s invocation of tort law as “point man in the response to 
power” to protect particularly vulnerable consumers.70 
II. AMAZON AS “CHEAPEST COST AVOIDER” 
The policy-intensive nature of the question of holding Amazon liable 
as a seller lends itself to a law and economics “cheapest cost avoider” 
analysis. As I have argued elsewhere: 
The rise and expansion of modern products liability law has resulted in “a 
profound shift in the orientation of legal doctrine,” away from addressing 
product-related harms via contract between parties in privity of contract to 
recognition of the direct regulation of defective products as an appropriate 
judicial function. In their attempts to deter harmful conduct, courts often sought 
to identify the party for whom an assignment of liability would result in the 
most efficient reduction in the accident costs—namely, the cheapest cost 
avoider.71 
A touchstone of products liability law is to hold liable entities involved in 
creating the product and bringing it to the consumer, who are best positioned 
to prevent against defective products entering the marketplace in the first 
instance and to internalize the costs of defects when they occur (including 
by pursuing indemnification claims against those it allows to sell on its 
site).72 Strict liability expanded from manufacturers to retailers precisely 
because “the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that the 
product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer 
to that end; the retailer’s strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to 
safety.”73 
 
 69 Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, 53 Cal. App. 5th 431, 2020 WL 4692387, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) 
(emphasis added); see also id. at *12 (“Amazon, like conventional retailers, may be the only member of 
the distribution chain reasonably available to an injured plaintiff who purchases a product on its 
website.”). For example, “third-party vendors [may] conceal themselves from the customer, leaving 
customers injured by defective products with no direct recourse to the third-party vendor. There are 
numerous cases in which neither Amazon nor the party injured by a defective product, sold by 
Amazon.com, were able to locate the product’s third-party vendor or manufacturer.” Oberdorf v. 
Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2019), certifying questions to Pa. S. Ct., 818 F. App’x 138 
(3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed per stipulation. 
 70 Shapo, Millennial Torts, supra note 17, at 1034. 
 71 Catherine M. Sharkey, Modern Tort Law: Preventing Harms, Not Recognizing Wrongs, 
134 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2021) (manuscript at 13–14) (on file with Northwestern University 
Law Review) (internal citation omitted) (reviewing JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, 
RECOGNIZING WRONGS (2020)) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review). 
 72 See id. at 17–30. 
 73 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964). 
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This same deterrence-based, prevention-of-harms rationale has been 
explicitly invoked in recent cases holding Amazon liable. As the California 
state appellate court in Bolger reasoned: “The strict liability doctrine derives 
from judicially perceived public policy considerations, i.e., enhancing 
product safety, maximizing protection to the injured plaintiff, and 
apportioning costs among the defendants.”74 
Significantly, Amazon itself touts safety as a top priority.75 According 
to an Amazon spokeswoman, the company “uses automated tools that scan 
hundreds of millions of items every few minutes to screen would-be sellers 
and block suspicious ones from registering and listing items, using the tools 
to block three billion items in 2018.”76 When the systems alert Amazon 
employees of a concern, they “move quickly to protect customers and work 
directly with sellers, brands, and government agencies.”77 Amazon is thus “in 
a position to halt the flow of any defective goods of which it bec[o]me[s] 
aware.”78 Indeed, “Amazon is uniquely positioned to receive reports of 
defective products, which in turn can lead to such products being removed 
from circulation.”79  
However, “[b]y design, Amazon’s business model cuts out the 
middlemen between manufacturers and consumers, reducing the friction that 
might keep foreign (or otherwise judgment-proof) manufacturers from 
putting dangerous products on the market.”80 Moreover, “Amazon requires 
that its vendors release it and agree to indemnify, defend, and hold it 
harmless against any claim, loss, damage, settlement, cost, expense, or other 
liability.”81 Amazon’s business model, in other words, is designed to insulate 
it from traditional strict products liability. 
 
 74 53 Cal. App. 5th, 2020 WL 4692387, at *8 (internal citation omitted); see also Stiner v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2019-0488, 2020 WL 5822477, at *6 (Ohio Oct. 1, 2020) (Donnelly, J., 
concurring in the judgment only) (“The use of strict liability would incentivize Amazon to select and 
monitor reputable merchants with safer products just as strict liability incentivizes sellers to select safer 
products that are sourced from reputable wholesalers or manufacturers.”). 
 75 See Berzon, Shifflett & Scheck, supra note 4. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. (quoting an Amazon spokesperson). 
 78 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 964, 972 (W.D. Wis. 2019); see 
also Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2019), certifying questions to Pa. S. Ct., 
818 F. App’x 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed per stipulation (“Amazon is fully capable, 
in its sole discretion, of removing unsafe products from its website.”); Gartner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
433 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1044 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (“Amazon could halt the placement of defective products 
in the stream of commerce, deterring future injuries.”). 
 79 Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 146. 
 80 Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 144 (4th Cir. 2019) (Motz, J., concurring). 
 81 Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 142. 
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Amazon plays a critical function in the modern consumer marketplace: 
as intermediary between manufacturer and purchaser, it has the ability to 
pressure those who make consumer goods to ensure that they are safe. As the 
federal district court in Wisconsin recognized, as “an integral part of the 
chain of distribution,” Amazon is “an entity well-positioned to allocate the 
risks of defective products to the participants in the chain” and equally 
“positioned to insure against the risk of defective products.”82 Amazon, in 
other words, is the cheapest cost avoider upon whom liability should be 
imposed.  
CONCLUSION 
The twenty-first century platform economy poses challenges for the 
existing twentieth century products liability regime. As Professor Shapo 
presciently foresaw, “[e]ven with the increase of government regulation in 
many areas of safety, torts remains in the trenches where scientific and 
technological advance creates new patterns of injury.”83 Moreover, “[t]ort 
also will continue to play the role of the initial decider between first-best and 
second-best solutions for emerging injury problems.”84 
The question of Amazon’s liability provides a perfect case study to 
illustrate how cultural and economic perspectives converge in the field of 
products liability; both the “tort-as-culture” lens and cheapest-cost-avoider 
analysis point in the direction of holding Amazon liable for dangerous or 
defective products sold through its platform.  
Moreover, I expect Professor Shapo would heartily embrace this 
convergence of cultural and economic perspectives. In the introduction to his 
2012 book, An Injury Law Constitution, he wrote: 
It is often useful to analyze society’s efforts to control risky conduct from an 
economic perspective. But running through the social judgments that are made 
on risk-generating behavior are moral notions of reparation, sometimes of 
punishment, often of vindication. All of these ideas partake of custom and 
culture, and the jagged profile of injury law reflects the fact that we are a land 
 
 82 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 390 F. Supp. 3d at 972; see Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2019-
0488, 2020 WL 5822477, at *6 (Ohio Oct. 1, 2020) (Donnelly, J., concurring in the judgment only) 
(“Because Amazon is so deeply involved in the chain of distribution leading to the Amazon customer, 
Amazon is well positioned to monitor third-party sellers and their products and to limit its e-commerce 
services to reputable third-party sellers that select safer products, just as sellers are in a position to select 
safer products that are sourced from reputable wholesalers or manufacturers.”). 
 83 Shapo, Millennial Torts, supra note 17, at 1031. 
 84 Id. at 1043. 
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of competing cultures and many customs. Mirroring these complexities are the 
different intensities of signals that the law sends out.85 
And as far back as his 1977 book, The Duty to Act: Tort Law, Power, and 
Public Policy, Professor Shapo wrote: 
Although I make rather little specific reference to this [economic perspective 
on tort law] in this work, this does not denigrate my debt to these and other 
authors who have enriched my thinking about tort law, but rather reflects the 
absorption of their ideas in the common currency of torts scholarship. It will 
also, however, imply a belief on my part that the analyses and usages of these 
scholars may be improved by the articulation of a framework centered on 
considerations of power relationships.86 
Perhaps the convergence of cultural and economic perspectives is a 
distinct feature of modern torts, where given the culture and politics of 
American law in 2020, a culturally specific norm incorporating power 
dynamics is efficiency-as-responsibility, meaning that the party with greatest 
control over a risk must pay for damages in the event of harm. 
 
 85 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, AN INJURY LAW CONSTITUTION, at xv (2012). 
 86 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER, AND PUBLIC POLICY, at xviii 
(1977). 
